THE JOHN MARSHALL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

HOW THE INTERNET HAS REMOVED THE HISTORICAL RATIONALE FOR
“NON-ANALOGOUS ARTS”
HAL MILTON
ABSTRACT
The growth of the Internet has affected countless aspects of daily life, including the patent system.
Internet-based legal research has grown considerably, given the convenience of general search
agents such as Google, legally-focused search agents such as Westlaw and Lexis, and patent-focused
search agents such as the PAIR system of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. These
legal research tools have not only made it easier to find prior art, they have also expanded the
volume of information that is available to one of ordinary skill in the art. Consequently, the
traditional rules of so-called “analogous arts” are changing. The Internet has made it easier to
render unpatentable an invention that has a parallel in some other field. If the inventor through a
routine Internet search could find prior art that has even a remote correlation to the invention, then
that invention may be rendered unpatentable. The conflicting case law suggests that a new
standard may be necessary to define “analogous arts” in light of a world that has changed faster
than the law.
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HOW THE INTERNET HAS REMOVED THE HISTORICAL RATIONALE FOR
“NON-ANALOGOUS ARTS”
HAL MILTON*
INTRODUCTION
This paper suggests that computer searching for prior art, combined with the
strict application of the case law of intended use, effectively eliminates “nonanalogous arts.” Two inconsistent Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”)
opinions are used to illustrate the dire need to bring order and certainty to
determining the pertinence of prior art.
Inventors, patent practitioners and patent examiners are hamstrung by the
current state of the law which fails to define when prior art in a different field of
endeavor can be, will be, or must be regarded as analogous, i.e., “pertinent.” A twoprong test is currently being applied to “define the scope of analogous prior art: (1)
whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem
addressed and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor,
whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with
which the inventor is involved”.1 This article will illustrate that inventors and patent
practitioners are not certain as to how far afield to go in searching for “pertinent”
prior art in evaluating patentability.2 Patent examiners are also uncertain as to
what can be used as “pertinent” prior art.3 As the examples used in this paper
illustrate, the United States Patent & Trademark Office (“USPTO”) rejected an
application on the basis that a toothbrush was pertinent to a hair brush; on appeal,
the CAFC affirmed two to one, with the dissenting member arguing that a
toothbrush is not pertinent to a hair brush.4 However, in a separate case, that one
member, together with two different judges of the CAFC, prevailed to reverse a
rejection by the USPTO on the basis that a “drawer” container divided by plates to
separate small articles was not pertinent to a “cup” container divided by plates to

* © Hal Milton 2013. Hal Milton teaches a course in patent application preparation at the

University of Notre Dame, Master of Science in Patent Law. Hal has been training the art of patent
application preparation for forty years and currently manages the Dickinson Wright Intellectual
Property Academy. He has authored a training book entitled Preparing a Patent Application in
Accordance with Appellate Opinions, available at patentarchitect.com, a word processing program
dedicated to preparing a patent application (U.S. Patent No. 7,890,851 (filed Mar. 19, 1999)). The
opinions in this paper are solely of the author and are not necessarily the opinions of Dickinson
Wright PLLC, its staff, or its clients.
1 In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also In re Klein, 647
F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2141.01(a) (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter
MPEP].
2 See infra Part III.
3 See, e.g., infra Part IV.A.
4 Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1327–28.
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separate sugar and water.5 Such contradictory and subjective opinions clearly
illustrate that the public is entitled to more certainty in the law and that the
profession cannot expertly serve the public without a more objective and reliable
definition of “pertinent” prior art. To this end, such an objective and more reliable
definition of “pertinent” prior art is readily available by adhering to and combining
legal precedent with digital computer searching.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Tests
An early U.S. Supreme Court case opined, “where the alleged novelty consists in
transferring a device from one . . . industry to another . . . we are bound to inquire
into the remoteness of relationship of the two industries.”6 The basis for analogous
arts resides in the remoteness of an inventor working in one industry or field of
endeavor from knowledge of the state of the art in another industry, i.e., the second
industry is too remote from the inventor’s field of endeavor.7 The issue is whether or
not the inventor in one field of art would or should be reasonably expected to search
in the second and seemingly unrelated art for a solution.8 A law journal article
published over one hundred years ago recognizes that whether prior art is analogous
or too remote “is a question of fact, upon which opinions may well differ.”9
Compounding the difference in factual interpretations, the underlying tools in
searching prior art for a solution have significantly changed in the intervening years
to include a wider array of prior art to be factually considered.10
In the early agrarian country of the 1800s, a wheat farmer in Kansas working in
the art of irrigation might not be held knowledgeable of the art of rinsing devices
used by dentists in New York. The wheat farmer did not have ready access to dental
rinsing devices in the 1800s but would now, via the Internet. The CAFC has recently
“reminded . . . the PTO that it is necessary to consider ‘the reality of the
circumstances’ . . . in deciding in which fields a person of ordinary skill would
reasonably be expected to look for a solution to the problem facing the inventor.”11
The “reality of the circumstances” is that the Kansas farmer is no longer “remote”
from the New York dentist. It is no longer a variable and subjective appraisal of
facts to determine where a person skilled in the art would or should search, because
the Internet renders digital and objective such factual interpretations. The prior art
Klein, 647 F.3d at 1352.
C. & A. Potts & Co. v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597, 606 (1895).
7 In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
8 Id.
9 William B. Whitney, Patentable Processes, 19 HARV. L. REV. 30, 45 (1905).
10 Patent
Application Information Retrieval, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (last visited Aug. 18, 2013); Advanced Patent Search, GOOGLE,
www.google.com/advanced_patent_search (last visited Aug. 18, 2013).
11 In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447
(Fed. Cir. 1992)).
5
6
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available via the Internet is significantly more inclusive than local libraries. Instead,
the foundation of “pertinence” resides in the search parameters, i.e., the terminology
an inventor or practitioner would use in searching for prior art via the Internet.
B. Judge Rich’s Wall of Prior Art Now Includes all of the Internet
Judge Rich was a primary architect in drafting 35 U.S.C. § 103 in 195212 and
stated later that “the proper way to apply the 103 obviousness test . . . is to first
picture the inventor as working in his shop with the prior art references—which he is
presumed to know—hanging on the walls around him.”13 Judge Rich considered it
obvious, or a mere use of common sense by the fictitious inventor, to select and
combine known elements displayed on the wall with no change in function of each
element. When the elements of a combination produce the predicted results for
which they were selected, the combination is not patentable,14 and the Internet
renders all known elements readily discoverable.
In KSR, the Court stated that “modern technology counsels against”
nonobviousness just because of a lack of “discussion” in the prior art literature.15
Modern Internet database searching allows that fictitious inventor to search by
element names, structure, function, and result.16 Such searching includes scholarly
resources in addition to searching prior art patents.17 Because of modern technology,
Judge Rich’s “inventor’s wall” now includes all of the information available by
searching the Internet. It is a mere matter of common sense and routine for the
fictitious inventor to search the Internet and select and combine known elements
without producing a new function, i.e., to produce predictable results.
Using the modern world of the Internet to establish Judge Rich’s wall of prior
art removes the issue of “remoteness” and digitally and objectively renders
“reasonably pertinent” consistent by holding an inventor constructively
knowledgeable of prior art resulting from a search conducted on the Internet. In
other words, the field of search replaces the elusive field of endeavor, i.e., the demise
of “non-analogous arts.”

12 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law:
The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 858 n.62
(2010).
13 Application of Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
14 Hal Milton & Patrick R. Anderson, The KSR Standard for Patentability, 89 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 616, 616–19 (2007).
15 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).
16 See generally Paul Schwander, An Evaluation of Patent Searching Resources: Comparing the
Professional and Free Online Databases, 22 WORLD PAT. INFO. 147, 151 (2000).
17 Robert S. Blasi, Responding to Bilski v. Kappos: Hoping For The Best, Planning For the
Worst, 2010 WL 6243302 at *7 (“Prior art searching has become an area dominated by specialty
search firms, and new electronic resources for prior art searches, such as Google Patents, Google
Scholar, and free patents online have made prior art search accessible to non-experts.”).
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C. The Inventor’s Constructive Notice of Prior Art
In accordance with Judge Rich’s wall of prior art, the inventor “is presumed to
know” of the prior art on the wall.18 The issue is the scope or pertinence of the art
included on that wall. In Judge Rich’s view, the inventor is presumed to have
knowledge or constructive notice of anticipatory prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102, as
well as “reasonably pertinent” prior art. Certainly, an invention cannot be held
patentable just because the inventor did not have actual knowledge of prior art, e.g.,
the inventor did not search the prior art.19 The USPTO is clearly allowed to apply
prior art of which the inventor had no previous knowledge.20 In the reality of
circumstances, the digital interpretation of pertinence is based on where the USPTO
searches, not where an inventor would search in making the invention.21 Pertinence
is also based on where the inventor or inventor’s agent would search to evaluate the
novelty of the invention, which in theory should be the same as the USPTO search.
In many of the circumstances of actual practice, the pertinence of prior art is
determined by triers of fact after submitting the patent application, rather than by
where the inventor should have or did actually search.22 Most inventors rely on
accumulated knowledge and do not search for ideas in making an invention; they
only search or have their practitioner search to evaluate patentability of the
invention after the invention is complete.23
To define what is new and being applied for in a patent application can only be
determined in relationship to the most pertinent prior art.24 In the reality of the
circumstances of present day practice, a reasonable search via the Internet
determines what is pertinent prior art regardless of the field of endeavor.25 It can be
argued that the case law requires a search in the patent preparation process.26 In
accordance with Graham v. John Deere Co., the fact finder should determine:
[“T]he scope and content of the prior art,” and [then] ascertain the
“differences between the prior art and the claims at issue . . . .” In
accordance [with] 35 U.S.C. § 112, a patent application “shall conclude with
one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”27

Winslow, 365 F.2d at 1020.
Id.
20 Id.
21 MPEP, supra note 1 § 904.02.
22 Id.
23 Gene Quinn, Patent Searching 101: A Patent Search Tutorial, IPWATCHDOG.COM (Mar. 17,
2012, 7:30 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/17/patent-searching-101-a-patent-searchtutorial/id=22851/.
24 MPEP, supra note 1 § 904.02.
25 Quinn, supra note 23.
26 Hal Milton, Patent Preparation Mandated by the Law, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
809, 813 (2007).
27 Id. at 813 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)); id. at 809 (quoting 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2006)).
18
19

[13:68 2013]

How the Internet has Removed the
Historical Rationale for "Non-Analogous Arts"

73

The only way these mandates can be met is in relationship to reasonably
pertinent prior art, which requires a search of the prior art. That search of the prior
art is now done on the Internet via a computer.28 The rationale of Judge Rich
imputes constructive knowledge to the inventor of all prior art found in a standard
search of Internet databases.
Just as it is incumbent upon a patent practitioner to advise an inventor of the
tests for patentability, the patent practitioner is also duty-bound to advise the
inventor that the patent application will be evaluated for patentability relative to the
most pertinent prior art that can be found.29 The only manner in which the patent
practitioner can satisfactorily draft a patent application to meet these tests is to be
aware of that prior art from a search by element name, structure, function or result.30
For a patent practitioner to prepare a patent application without a search of the prior
art is tantamount to a medical doctor setting a broken bone without the benefit of an
X-ray. In days past, the doctor did not have the benefit of seeing a broken bone, and
the patent agent had limited access to all of the publications in the world.
Technology has since changed the standard of care for both doctors and patent
practitioners. Therefore, it is time for recognition of that change in the law of nonanalogous arts to thereby “provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater
predictability and greater respect for the rule of law.”31 It is incumbent upon the law
to move from a variable/subjective appraisal of facts to a digital/objective analysis of
facts to render the law commensurate with modern technology. For example, in
criminal cases, many fact situations were historically interpreted under subjective
legal tests, whereas more sophisticated technology, such as DNA, allows a new
digital legal test and brings more certainty to the law.
II. A THRESHOLD ISSUE IN THE DEFINITION OF THE “FIELD OF ENDEAVOR”
A threshold issue in claim interpretation often arises to ascertain the
remoteness of the “field of endeavor” before getting to “reasonably pertinent.” The
interpretation issue frequently arises when terms in a claim attempt to imply an
intended use, external function, or selective use.32 The recitations in claims of
intended use or selective use usually occur in the recitation of an adjective to identify

28 See supra text accompanying note 10 (identifying two common Internet search mechanisms
for reviewing prior art).
29 See Allergan Inc. v. Barr Labs. Inc., No. 09–333–SLR–LPS, 2010 WL 3328270, at *1 (D. Del.
Aug. 18, 2010) (citing In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2000))
(stating that an attorney must know the prior art to evaluate patentability and properly prepare a
patent application).
30 See generally Schwander, supra note 16. The author practiced in Class 74, sub-classes 501
et seq. over forty years and every new invention was searched even though we thought we knew the
prior art.
31 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS xxix (2012).
32 See, e.g., In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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an element and/or an implied use.33 An intended or selective use or external function
does not necessarily occur in all uses of the claimed elements and is distinguished
from an inherent or internal function, which always occurs internally between
positively recited elements.34
Courts have held that an intended use is not appropriate for determining the
actual scope of patentability.35 The Supreme Court opined in KSR that “familiar
items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.”36 The United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”) has held that, “If we are to exclude
references on the ground that they are selected from a non-analogous art, the claims
must positively include those limitations which are asserted to distinguish the
claimed apparatus from the apparatus shown in such art.”37 In 1997, the CAFC
reviewed an apparatus claim for use with popcorn, wherein we have underlined the
intended use recitations:
1. A dispensing top for passing only several kernels of a popped popcorn at
a time from an open-ended container filled with popped popcorn, having a
generally conical shape and an opening at each end, the opening at the
reduced end allows several kernels of popped popcorn to pass through at the
same time, and means at the enlarged end of the top to embrace the open
end of the container, the taper of the top being uniform and such as to by
itself jam up the popped popcorn before the end of the cone and permit the
dispensing of only a few kernels at a shake of a package when the top is
mounted on the container.38
The CAFC opined:
Although Schreiber is correct that Harz does not address the use of the
disclosed structure to dispense popcorn, the absence of a disclosure relating
to function does not defeat the Board’s finding of anticipation. It is well
settled that the recitation of a new intended use for an old product does not
make a claim to that old product patentable.39 Accordingly, Schreiber’s
33 See Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., No. C 01-04204 CRB, 2002 WL 32166568, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2002).
34 See Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Dolphin Jute Mills, 50 F. Supp. 395, 398 (D.N.J. 1943).
35 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402–03 (2007).
36 Id. at 402.
37 Application of Sebald, 268 F.2d 430, 432 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
38 In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
39 See In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The discovery of a new property or use
of a previously known composition, even when that property and use are unobvious from the prior
art, can not [sic] impart patentability to claims to the known composition.”); Titanium Metals Corp.
of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that a composition claim for a newly
discovered property of an old alloy did not satisfy section 102 because the alloy itself was not new);
In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1403 (C.C.P.A 1974) (holding that the intended use of an old
composition does not render composition claim patentable); In re Zierden, 411 F.2d 1325, 1328
(C.C.P.A. 1969) (“[M]ere statement of a new use for an otherwise old or obvious composition cannot
render a claim to the composition patentable.”); In re Sinex, 309 F.2d 488, 492 (C.C.P.A. 1962)
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contention that his structure will be used to dispense popcorn does not have
patentable weight if the structure is already known, regardless of whether
it has ever been used in any way in connection with popcorn.40
It is important to note that Judge Newman dissented from the above opinion:
The Federal Circuit has held, over and over, that every claim limitation is
important and none can be ignored—and now proceeds to ignore several
express limitations. Thus the panel incongruously holds that a claim that
requires, explicitly and precisely, a container of popcorn and a dispenser
that passes only a few kernels of popcorn before jamming, is “anticipated”
by an oil can of a different shape as illustrated in a reference that neither
shows nor suggests a container filled with popcorn or the jamming of the
dispenser upon dispensing the popcorn.41
Notwithstanding the position of Judge Newman, the cases are clear that stating
the intended use of invention will not limit the scope of the claims;42 only structure
which is specifically and positively recited as included after the non-limiting
preamble can limit an invention regardless of use, known or undiscovered.43 The
preamble “should contain language which . . . suggests the subject matter of the
claim, and not a use or purpose of that subject matter.”44
There has been a lack of application of this settled case law that the recitation of
an intended or implied field of use neither limits a claim to that “field of endeavor,”
nor excludes otherwise “reasonably pertinent” prior art. The existing case law should
be more consistently applied to hold that a recitation in a claim of intended use is
given only an identifying meaning and does not limit the field of endeavor or field of
search to thereby prevent prior art from being deemed reasonably pertinent. The
steadfast application of this rule will bring more certainty to what prior art is
“reasonably pertinent,” as well as to bring claims more in line with 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Such certainty of prior art that is not remote and can be considered to be pertinent
should be based on the reality of the circumstances of searching on the Internet.

(stating that the statement of intended use in an apparatus claim failed to distinguish over the prior
art apparatus); In re Hack, 245 F.2d 246, 248 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (“[T]he grant of a patent on a
composition or a machine cannot be predicated on a new use of that machine or composition.”); In re
Benner, 174 F.2d 938, 942 (C.C.P.A. 1949) (“[N]o provision has been made in the patent statutes for
granting a patent upon an old product based solely upon discovery of a new use for such product.”).
40 Id. at 1477 (citations omitted).
41 Id. at 1480 (Newman, J., dissenting).
42 See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990–91 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
43 See Regent Jack Mfg. Co. v. United States, 292 F.2d 868, 881–82 (Fed. Cl. 1961).
44 Stephen P. Koch, Interpreting Claim Preambles: An Analytic Framework, 11 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 117, 137 (2002).
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A. The Relationship of Intended Use to Internal and Inherent Functional Phrases
An inventory or catalog form of an assembly claim would contain no functional
language and no connections between elements, i.e., the claim would only recite what
the elements are and not how the elements operate or what they do. For example,
the elements of a ball used in a baseball game could be listed in such a catalog of
parts:
A ball comprising:
a core of solid material,
a length of yarn,
a cover, and
stitching.
The disassociated elements are not combined or interconnected and do not
constitute a ball. They are but separate and unconnected elements which may be
individually stored in storage bins dedicated to like elements. Such a failure “to
interrelate essential elements . . . may be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112.”45
But the claim can avoid being a catalog of parts by reciting how the elements are
connected or interrelated but without any function, i.e., the static state (with added
underlines):
a core of solid material,
a length of yarn disposed tightly in tension to define a winding about said
core,
a cover including complementary sections surrounding said winding, and
stitching interconnecting said sections of said cover.
The internal function of a claim is that function occurring between the elements
positively recited in the claim.46 An example of the added internal function would be:
a core of solid material,
a length of yarn disposed tightly in tension to define a winding about said
core for reacting with said core and absorbing impact energy and
rebounding,

45
46

MPEP, supra note 1 § 2172.01.
Id. § 2173.05(g).
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a cover including complementary sections surrounding and retaining said
winding in position about said core, and
stitching interconnecting said sections of said cover and tensioning said
cover over said winding.
The internal functions of “retaining said winding in position” and “tensioning
said cover over said winding” occur between the positively recited elements as the
ball rests in steady state. In addition, internal functions may also include functions
that inherently occur between positively recited elements in response to use or
operation of the recited elements.47 The recitation “for reacting with said core and
absorbing impact energy and rebounding” is an inherent function which occurs
inherently when the ball is impacted by an outside force by a bat during use; i.e.,
every time the ball is impacted with an outside force this function always occurs.
There is no choice in whether or not this function occurs during impact in the use of
the recited elements, without exception. A claim should cover the product leaving
the loading dock of the manufacturer or on the desk as a trophy—the connected or
interrelated baseball elements per se—and not depend upon the choice of use by the
purchaser.
In contradistinction, an intended use results from a choice among a plurality of
possible uses or external functions of the recited elements; it is not inherent. For
example, it is a choice to use a hair brush as a toothbrush and there is nothing
inherent in the structure or operation of a hair brush to prevent it from being used
for cleaning. An intended use usually relies upon an element which is not positively
recited in the claim but is an element upon which the intended use depends.48 For
example, “hair” is not positively recited and is an outside element upon which the use
is intended, but does not exclude the use of the positively recited elements on
elephant tusks or clothing to remove lint. An intended use of the baseball elements
claimed above is recited in the same claim form as in the divided container to feed
birds to be discussed hereinafter:49
a core of solid material,
a length of yarn disposed tightly in tension to define a winding about said
core for reacting with said core and absorbing impact energy and
rebounding,
a cover including complementary sections surrounding and retaining said
winding in position about said core, and
stitching interconnecting said sections of said cover and tensioning said
cover over said winding,

Id. § 2163.07(a).
Id. § 2114(II).
49 U.S. Patent No. 8,147,119 (filed July 24, 2002) (regarding the patent at issue in In re Klein).
47
48
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wherein said cover is adapted to receive and maintain autographs in ink,
and wherein said cover may receive a coating over the cover and for
preventing oxidation and coloring of the cover and allows the ball to be
displayed as a trophy in an adverse environment.
This recitation of intended use adds no structure, but only a choice of use by the
ultimate user. The USPTO and the courts should not allow such a claim in a patent
when the prior art discloses a ball including a core, a winding, and a cover, but
wherein the cover is of a material which cannot “receive and maintain autographs in
ink” nor includes “a coating of the autographs.”
In summary, an intended use of an assembly is an external function that occurs
in its intended environment of use or utility and should not limit the interpretation of
a claim and certainly not limit the interpretation to that intended field of endeavor
(use). An internal function is a function that inherently occurs internally between
the elements regardless of the ultimate intended use of the combination of elements.
The only function in a claim that should be limiting in interpretation is the internal
function attributable to the interaction of the elements positively recited in the claim.
The congruity of interpreting an intended use to limit the field of endeavor for
pertinent prior art is that infringement of that external function cannot be
determined by examining the accused product on the competitor’s loading dock. The
infringement can only be determined after the external function occurs in use by the
ultimate end user. Is there no infringement if the hair brush is used for cleaning?
The ultimate result is chaos, let alone uncertainty for the public.
B. Adjectives Identify and do not Specify
It is important to appreciate that an adjective does not specify structure in an
element; the adjective merely identifies the element. Merely identifying an element
by an adjective does not technically attribute physical characteristics to that element.
A “steel baffle” is not necessarily made of metal.50 Likewise, the recitation of “a
plastic conduit” does not positively limit the conduit to plastic. The proper recitation
is “a conduit of plastic material.” The “plastic” adjective merely identifies the conduit
and distinguishes that conduit from a second or another conduit recited in the claim,
e.g., a “metal conduit.” That the conduit consists of plastic is a structural limitation
and must be positively recited. A “wood bat” is not technically limiting; it should be
recited as a “bat of wood.” As the cases illustrate, some will interpret a wood bat to
be limited to wood, while others will not.51 If a “wood bat” is meant to distinguish
from a bat of another material, the wood limitation should be recited more positively
or be emphasized more than with just an adjective, i.e., a bat consisting of wood.

50 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1213–14 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In Phillips, the claim
construction issue was whether the term “baffle” included both those angled at 90 degrees and other
than 90 degrees. Id. The majority opinion held that the plain meaning of the term did not limit
“baffles” to only those at 90 degrees. Id.
51 See infra Part IV.
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As another example, a liquid container is not technically limited in structure to
being impervious to liquid, but is only identified and distinguished from any other
container recited in the claim, i.e., from an air breathing container. An examiner in
the USPTO is entitled to interpret the liquid container as a first container and the
air breathing container as a second container.52 Regardless of what adjective
precedes “container,” the adjective can be interpreted only to identify and distinguish
the container from other containers. A container identified by an adjective may be
interpreted to cover any container until the actual distinguishing physical attributes
of the container are positively recited in the claims. In order for the liquid container
to be limited to a container only for a liquid, it must be recited as a container
impervious to liquid for retaining liquid therein. Otherwise, a recitation of a liquid
container could be interpreted to cover any container whether or not it is impervious
to a liquid. Similarly, the “air breathing container” must be recited as an air
breathing container being porous for allowing the passage of air there through.
These examples are doctrinaire but illustrate the need to limit the interpretation of
adjectives only to identify and not to specify structure or intended use to avoid the
diverse and varied results exemplified by the following CAFC opinions.
III. TWO DIVERSE ANALOGOUS ART CAFC OPINIONS
As recognized over one hundred years ago, the subjective appraisal of the “field
of endeavor” and “reasonably pertinent” to render prior art non-analogous varies
widely among those making that judgment.53 This variance is clearly illustrated in
two inconsistent CAFC opinions in appeals from the USPTO.54 In addition, these
cases illustrate the threshold problem of claim interpretation to initially define the
“field of endeavor.”
A. In re Bigio
1. The USPTO Claim Interpretation
Bigio’s patent application claimed a “hair brush.”55 The claimed hair brush
features an allegedly unique shape, namely an hourglass configuration for both the
bristle substrate (14) and the overall bristle array (25).56 The claims recited a “hair
brush” in the preamble and “hair brush bristles” in the positive recitations, but in
both recitations, “hair” was used only as an adjective to identify and was not

MPEP, supra note 1 § 2111.
Whitney, supra note 9, at 45.
54 In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
55 Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1322.
56 Id. at 1323; U.S. Patent No. 7,448,111 (filed Mar. 16, 2007).
52
53
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accompanied by any structure in the claim requiring use only on “hair.”57 The
USPTO Examiner and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”)
construed the term “hair brush” to include “not only brushes that may be used for
human hair on [a] scalp, but also brushes that may be used for hairs [o]n other parts
of animal bodies (e.g. human facial hair, human eyebrow hair, or pet hair).”58 By this
interpretation, the BPAI relied upon the intended use or external function of the
brush as expressed only in the adjective “hair.” This allowed the rationale that the
toothbrush could be used on facial hair, e.g., to color a beard.
By this interpretation, the Examiner and the BPAI, at least inferentially, gave a
distinguishing limitation to the adjective “hair” in the claims, i.e., limited the claim
to brushes for brushing hair, notwithstanding the fact that no structure was recited
limiting the brush for use only on “hair.”59 The claim was interpreted by the BPAI to
be limited to brushes for any kind of hair and that the toothbrushes could be used to
brush hair.60 Instead of relying on the use of the brush for hair, the examiner, the
BPAI, and the court could have and should have recognized that the potential uses of
the brush are not so limited, e.g., the brushes could be used for the cleaning of
elephant tusks, bathrooms, cooking grills, leather, and tires, etc. Had the existing
case law of intended use denying any such limitation to “hair” been rigidly applied,
there would have been no need to argue that toothbrushes could be used to brush
hair. Any brush having the same shape is in the field of brushes and is reasonably
pertinent to any other brush regardless of intended use. The only issue should have
been whether the structure recited in the claims is found in another brush regardless
of the intended use. The recitation of the adjective “hair” before “brush” to imply an
intended use, without additional recitation in the claim of structure requiring that
intended use, should have been given only an identifying or distinguishing meaning.
Such a positive recitation would have rendered moot whether or not a toothbrush can
be used to brush hair, i.e., the adjective “hair” does not further limit the field of
brushes, nor exclude other brushes from being reasonably pertinent.
2. The USPTO Rejection on the Merits
The examiner rejected Bigio’s application as obvious in view of three references,
each disclosing a particular configuration of a toothbrush.61 The issue before the
BPAI was the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as “unpatentable over Flemming” (GB
17,666) “in view of either Tobias” (D424,303) “or Cohen” (D140,438).62 The BPAI held
that disclosure of the toothbrush of Flemming met all of the structural limitations of
the Bigio claims and that the teachings of Tobias and Cohen were cumulative to the
teachings of Flemming.63 Indeed, the Flemming patent discloses the distinguishing
Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1323–24; Patent No. ‘111; supra note 56.
Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1323–24.
59 Ex parte Bigio, No. 2002-0967, at 4 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 24, 2003).
60 Id. at 5.
61 Id. at 2.
62 Id. at 2.
63 Id. at 7.
57
58
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structural limitations in the Bigio claim of a bristle substrate (14) having an
hourglass shape and carrying bristles (25) in an hourglass shape as shown by
comparing Figure 3 of Bigio64 to Figure 8a65 of Flemming:

In reaching this reading of the claims, the BPAI referred to a dictionary
definition of “hairbrush” and reasoned that it is “required to give the term ‘hair
brush’ its broadest reasonable meaning in its ordinary usage.”66
The BPAI went on to say “that Flemming’s toothbrush may easily be used for
brushing hair” and cited In re Sinex for the proposition “that a statement of intended
use in a claim fails to distinguish over the prior art.”67 The rigid application of this
statement would not have limited the brush to any specific use, i.e., there was no
need to state that the toothbrush could be used only on hair.
However, the issue sent to the CAFC was whether the art of toothbrushes was
analogous to Bigio’s hair brush, and, more specifically, whether toothbrushes were
from the same field of endeavor as hair brushes, i.e., the remoteness of toothbrushes
from hair brushes.68 If toothbrushes are not too remote, toothbrushes become
pertinent to hair brushes.
U.S. Patent No. 6,739,016 fig. 3 (filed Sept. 17, 2001).
Gr. Brit. Patent No. 17,666 fig. 8a (filed Sept. 21, 1895).
66 Ex parte Bigio, No. 2002-0967, at 4 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 24, 2003).
67 Id. at 5–6.
68 In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
64
65
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3. The Majority Opinion
The Court reiterated the credence given by the USPTO to the word “hair” as
limiting the “field of endeavor” to structures for brushing hair:
In this case, the Board reached its assessment of the field of the invention
with reference to the function and structure of the invention. Specifically,
the Board concluded that Flemming’s toothbrush was in Bigio’s field of
endeavor because “the structural similarities between toothbrushes and
small brushes for hair would have led one of ordinary skill in the art
working in the specific field of hairbrushes to consider all similar brushes
including toothbrushes.” The Board thus correctly set the field of the
invention by consulting the structure and function of the claimed invention
as perceived by one of ordinary skill in the art.69
However, the CAFC went on to opine:
At the outset, the word “hair” preceding “brush” throughout the body of the
claim does not alone limit the claim to brushes for scalp hair. At best, the
word “hair” carries the meaning that the claimed invention involves
brushing some kind of hair. The claim, however, does not specify or limit
the claim to any particular kind of hair.70
The Court affirmed the BPAI interpretation of “hair brush” and stated, “that
term may reasonably encompass more than a grooming device for scalp hair.”71 This
dictum by the Court is clearly subjective and nonsensical. If the adjective “hair”
“does not specify the kind of hair to be groomed,”72 why does it limit the claim to hair
at all? If the claim is not limited to use on scalp hair, the claim is not limited to any
use. Could the hair brush be used on fur? Indeed, it is what it is, not what it does;
the “hair” brush is simply a brush regardless of its intended use without recited
structure limiting its use only to brushing hair. That hair cannot be split.
The majority stated that the BPAI opinion was in keeping with the counsel of
Judge Rich in a predecessor C.C.P.A. opinion, to which the majority quoted and
added emphasis: “The differences are mere change of size and substitution of
material of the most obvious kind, on a par with the differences between a hairbrush
and a toothbrush.”73
4. The Dissent
Notwithstanding this relevant dictum of Judge Rich, Judge Newman opined:
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1325.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1327 (quoting In re Wolfe, 251 F.2d 854, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (emphasis added)).
69
70
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I respectfully dissent. The toothbrush art is not analogous to the hair brush
art. Bigio’s patent application is directed to a hair brush, and his claims are
limited to a hair brush. A brush for hair has no more relation to a brush for
teeth than does hair resemble teeth.
The mode and mechanics of brushing teeth cannot reasonably be viewed as
analogous to the mode and mechanics of brushing hair. 74
Clearly there is a wide variance in the subjective appraisal of what is nonanalogous art among sophisticated and experienced judges. Even Judge Newman
has been inconsistent. In a chemical case in 1990 involving a composition having in
use “normally tacky pressure-sensitive adhesive-properties admitted to be different
from hardness and abrasion resistance”75 of the same prior art composition, Judge
Newman opined:
The discovery of a new property or use of a previously known composition,
even when that property and use are unobvious from the prior art, can not
impart patentability to claims to the known composition. Thus, the initial
inquiry is to the novelty of the composition . . . .
As we observed supra, discovery of an unobvious property and use does not
overcome the statutory restraint of section 102 when the claimed
composition is known . . . . When the claimed compositions are not novel
they are not rendered patentable by recitation of properties, whether or not
these properties are shown or suggested in the prior art.76
As alluded to above, the threshold issue has resided in claim interpretation to
first determine the definition of the “field of endeavor” before getting to “reasonably
pertinent.” That threshold issue here resided in the word “hair” used as an adjective.
In accordance with Judge Newman’s rationale, infringement of the Bigio hair
brush claim cannot be determined until the brush is used to comb hair. If the Bigio
hair brush is used to clean elephant tusks, would there be no infringement?
B. In re Klein
1. The USPTO Claim Interpretation
The threshold issue with Klein is also the interpretation of claims to define the
“field of endeavor.” The only structures or elements positively recited in the broadest
claim are: a container (11) adapted to receive water, receiving means affixed to the
container (referring to the various “rails” numbered 15, 16, and 17 and labeled H, O,
Id. at 1327.
In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 707 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
76 Spada, 911 F.2d at 709 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
74
75
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and B in Fig. 1), and a divider (21) movably held by the receiving means (rails).77
The broadest claim of the Klein application is directed to:
A convenience nectar mixing and storage device for use in the preparation
of sugar-water nectar for feeding hummingbirds, orioles or butterflies, said
device comprising:
a container that is adapted to receive water,
engagement means fixed or fitted to said container,
a divider adapted to be movably held by said engagement means for forming
a compartment within said container, wherein said compartment has a
volume that is proportionately less than a volume of said container.78

77
78

U.S. Patent 8,147,119 figs. 1–4 (filed July 24, 2002).
U.S. Patent Application No. 10/200,747 at 6 (filed Feb. 28, 2006).

[13:68 2013]

How the Internet has Removed the
Historical Rationale for "Non-Analogous Arts"

85

The last recitation above is inherent and redundant because the divider
inherently forms a compartment in the container less than the volume of the entire
container. More importantly, this claim continues by reciting additional nonstructural and intended use language in the form of the intended use of the baseball
cover example above:
[B]y a ratio established for the formulation of sugar-water nectar for
hummingbirds, orioles or butterflies, wherein said compartment is adapted
to receive sugar, and wherein said divider is movable from said engagement
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means allows mixing of said sugar and water to occur to provide said sugarwater nectar.79
Although the claim implies that the divider (21) seals with the container (11) to
hold water for “mixing of said sugar and water,” there is absolutely no positive
recitation of structure to support that sealing function, e.g., a resilient divider to
perfect a seal between the divider (21) and the container (11) to prevent leakage of
water into the sugar compartment.
The examiner correctly gave no weight to the non-structural and intended use
recitations:
With regard to use of the device as a nectar mixing and storage device and
with particular respect to claims . . . recitations of intended use have not
been afforded any patentable weight because it has been held that a
recitation with respect to the manner in which a claimed apparatus is
intended to be employed does not differentiate the claimed apparatus from
a prior art apparatus satisfying the claimed structural limitations. The
claim language . . . of intended use . . . impart[s] no structure to the claimed
apparatus. It is well settled that the intended use of an apparatus is not
germane to its patentability.80
2. The USPTO Rejection on the Merits
The three primary patents relied upon by the examiner each disclose a container
with a removable divider: (1) Roberts 580,89981 is directed to an apparatus
comprising receptacles designed to receive “statement-cards” and removable
partitions that would subdivide the receptacles into compartments; (2) O’Connor
1,523,13682 is directed to a tool tray having dividers that were readily removable, and
that was adapted to contain comparatively small articles, e.g., drills, reamers, bits,
etc., or hardware supplies such as bolts or nuts; and (3) Kirkman 2,985,33383 is
directed to a drawer with removable partitions for dividing the drawer into two or
more compartments of varying size. Figure 1 from the Kirkman ‘333 patent84 (shown
below) is generally representative of the type of devices disclosed in each of the three
patents:

Id.
Examiner’s Non-Final Rejection of U.S. Patent Application No. 10/200,747 15 (Jan. 30,
2004)[hereinafter Non-Final Rejection].
81 U.S. Patent No. 580,899 l.64 (filed Aug. 26, 1895).
82 U.S. Patent No. 1,523,136 l.8 (filed June 19, 1920).
83 U.S. Patent No. 2,985,333 col.2 l.5 (filed Feb. 23, 1960).
84 ‘333 Patent, supra note 83, fig. 1.
79
80
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The two secondary patents relied upon by the examiner included: Greenspan
2,787,26885 directed to a blood plasma bottle having compartments for dried plasma
and water separated by a wall with a plug, wherein the plug could be removed to
allow for mixing; and De Santo 3,221,91786 similarly teaching two compartments
designed to hold two different types of fluid that could be mixed together by removing
a valve in the partition separating the compartments. Thus, each reference was
capable of holding a liquid and was directed to “containers that facilitate the mixing
of two separated substances together.”87
The examiner searched for containers having dividers removably inserted into
rails,88 the only structure recited in the broadest claim. The rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 102 over Kirkman is exemplary: the patent to Kirkman discloses a device
including a slidably removable divider (9) for dividing a container (1) into multiple
compartments of a predetermined volume and a series of engagement rails (8) sized
to receive the divider (9) and located to divide the volume of the container into
multiple compartments each of a predetermined volume.89 The Court summarized
the BPAI opinion:
According to the Board, “[t]hose of skill in the art would have had reason to
use the known ratios with the available containers having movable dividers
to achieve the correct proportions of water and sugar and to mix the
ingredients for different nectars.” The Board rejected Mr. Klein’s argument
that the five cited references are non-analogous art. In doing so, the Board
found that the prior art was properly relied upon by the examiner because it
is reasonably pertinent to the problem Mr. Klein addresses, which the

U.S. Patent No. 2,787,268 col.2 l.12 (filed Mar 16, 1956).
U.S. Patent No. 3,221,917 col.2 l.19 (filed July 2, 1963).
87 In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
88 Non-Final Rejection, supra note 80, at 14–15.
89 ‘899 Patent, supra note 81, l.64; ‘333 Patent, supra note 83, col.2 l.5.
85
86
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Board found to be “making a nectar feeder with a movable divider to
prepare different ratios of sugar and water for different animals.”90
3. The CAFC’s Opinion
The opinion of the three-judge panel, including Judge Newman, is consistent
with Judge Newman’s dissent in In re Bigio91 above. In contradistinction to the Bigio
hair brush decision, here the CAFC gave credence to the recitations of intended use.
The Klein opinion stated:
[T]hat the Board’s conclusory finding that Roberts, O‘Connor, and Kirkman
are analogous is not supported by substantial evidence. The purpose of
each of Roberts, O‘Connor, or Kirkman is to separate solid objects. An
inventor considering the problem of “making a nectar feeder with a movable
divider to prepare different ratios of sugar and water for different animals,”
would not have been motivated to consider any of these references when
making his invention, particularly since none of these three references
shows a partitioned container that is adapted to receive water or contain it
long enough to be able to prepare different ratios in the different
compartments.92
The court itself was conclusory in stating that Klein “would not have been
motivated to consider any” container to receive water and a divider to divide the
container into compartments. Clearly, the rules of claim interpretation to define the
field of endeavor differ substantially between In re Bigio and In re Klein. The
“reality of the circumstances” is that inventors, patent practitioners, and patent office
examiners cannot and should not operate under Judge Newman’s rationale.
IV. THE DIGITAL AND OBJECTIVE INTERNET SEARCHING FOR DETERMINING “REASONABLY
PERTINENT”
A. Reasonable Search Results = Reasonably Pertinent
As illustrated by the two opinions above, the factual determination of
“pertinence” is a subjective appraisal over which experienced judges differ. It is
impossible for such a judge to precisely and objectively get inside an inventor’s head
and determine in an objective manner where the inventor would have looked; how far
is remote? The fact question of “remoteness” of the second field of art depends upon
the sophistication of a particular inventor. Under the law, the inventor is a fictitious
person, held to a fictitious standard, allowing a judge to subjectively appraise the
Klein, 647 F.3d at 1347 (citations omitted).
In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
92 Klein, 647 F.3d at 1350–51.
90
91
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facts and judge where that particular inventor should have searched. This subjective
appraisal of the inventor’s fact situation is certainly problematic. In this appraisal of
the facts, it does not matter to the ultimate trier of fact as to where the inventor or
the inventor’s practitioner actually searched. What matters to that trier of fact is the
prior art developed in a post hoc search and opined to be pertinent. It did not matter
where Bigio or Klein actually searched or what they had knowledge of; only an
appraisal of the prior art developed in the post hoc examination process by the
USPTO was determinative.
Notwithstanding varying judicial opinions, inventors, patent practitioners, and
patent office examiners are much more constrained in the actual factual
determination of the “field of endeavor” and “reasonably pertinent” by dependency on
digital and objective facts resulting from the use of the Internet and search programs
to find pertinent prior art. The Internet eliminates “the remoteness of relationship of
the two industries” by eliminating a distinction between the “field of endeavor” and
“reasonably pertinent” as found in a reasonable search.93 As a general proposition,
any prior art produced in a reasonable search on the Internet by element name,
structure, function, or result, should be “reasonably pertinent,” thereby eliminating
“remoteness,” “field of endeavor,” and “analogous” as determinative factors. In the
reality of circumstances created by the digital world of the Internet, the “field of
endeavor” has been replaced by a reasonable field of search, which, in turn,
determines pertinence.
The fictitious inventor should be held to a standard of a reasonable search of the
Internet with the digital and objective search results being deemed “reasonably
pertinent.” If the hair brush search leads to tooth brushes in general, then tooth
brushes are, ipso facto, “reasonably pertinent,” and if the bird feeder search leads to
containers with removable dividers, then such containers are, ipso facto, “reasonably
pertinent.”
B. Using the USPTO Tutorial for Conducting a Search of the Prior Art
As a guidepost for conducting a reasonable search to determine which art is
“reasonably pertinent” to an invention, the USPTO has generated a tutorial on its
website to aid inventors in performing a patentability search.94 The pertinent parts
of the tutorial include an explanation of the U.S. Patent Classification (“USPC”)95
and a classification search.96 The tutorial informs the inventor that in addition to
world-wide patents, the USPTO searches include websites and databases.97 In
93 C. & A. Potts & Co. v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597, 606 (1895); In re Kylstra, 87 F.2d 487, 488
(C.C.P.A. 1937).
94 Conducting
a Patent Search at a PTDLP, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/ptdl/CBT/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2013) [hereinafter USPTO
Tutorial].
95 See Examiner Handbook to the U.S. Patent Classification System, UNITED STATE PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/handbook (last
modified Jan. 1, 2013) (explaining the purpose of the USPC system and how it is used).
96 USPTO Tutorial, supra note 94.
97 Id.
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addition, the inventor is advised that images of patents are available from 1790 but
keyword searching is only available in patents since 1976.98 The “classification
system is an arrangement of hierarchical categories used to organize ‘things’ by their
characteristics and relationships.”99 In the examples of the USPC, the tutorial lists
class “15, Brushing, scrubbing, and general cleaning” and specifically states that a
“tooth or nail brushes” are classified under class 015, sub-class 167.1.100 This is
interesting because the Bigio hair brush patent 6,739,016 was eventually issued in
the same class 015, and a very close sub-class 160,101 the pertinence of which will
become clearer hereinafter in connection with the “standard” Bigio “hair brush”
search.
The tutorial continues by admonishing against a total reliance upon a keyword
search because of inconsistent uses of terminology, names becoming obsolete, and
different meanings in different fields of art.102 Instead, the tutorial suggests a search
by description, function, result, structure and/or use, i.e., element name, structure,
function and/or result.103 Each of these terms is then looked up in the index to the
USPC to note potential classes and sub-classes.104 The tutorial provides an example
of a dog feeding bowl which leads to the class 119 of Animal Husbandry and the 72+
sub-classes, which will be reviewed hereinafter in connection with the Klein bird
feeder search.105
The tutorial refers to the class definitions and the references therein that point
to other appropriate classes and subclasses.106 The tutorial teaches the actual
searching process and retrieval of patents found in the search.107 A review of the
classes and subclasses searched and the references cited in a pertinent patent is also
suggested.108
C. Applying the Digital/Objective Search to Bigio’s Hair Brush
Both hair brushes and tooth brushes are classified in the same class 15 relating
generally to brushes of any kind.109 Obviously, some patents classified in class 15
relate to an invention applicable to various kinds of brushes, thereby rendering all
brushes reasonably pertinent to any specific brush regardless of the respective

Id.
Id.
100 Id.
101 ‘016 Patent, supra note 64.
102 USPTO Tutorial, supra note 94.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 USPTO Tutorial, supra note 94.
109 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASS 15 BRUSHING, SCRUBBING, AND GENERAL
CLEANING, available at www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc015/sched015.pdf [hereinafter
CLASS 15].
98
99
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intended uses. Nevertheless, we will assume Bigio made a search in accordance with
the USPTO tutorial.
The previously mentioned reasonable search standard was repeated to
determine the pertinence for the Bigio brush design, using the TotalPatent database,
provided by LexisNexis,110 and the European Patent Office Database, provided by
Espace.111
In the search, relevant keywords were determined based on a complete
examination of the physical structure, essential function, intended use, and end
result of all comprising elements of the Bigio hair brush design. The following
keywords were determined to be relevant: bristle, quill, shaft, scalp, fluff, clean,
primp, brush, groom, head, substrate, elliptical cross-section, and hourglass shape.
Next, relevant United States patent classifications were determined by
searching for each of the identified keywords within the Index to the United States
Patent Classification (“USPC”) System.
Likewise, international patent
classifications could be identified using the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”)112 International Patent Classification (“IPC”)113 Official Publication. The
following U.S. patent classifications were determined to be relevant:
15/160:
Brushing, scrubbing,
broom . . . special work

and

general

cleaning

/

brush

or

15/186: Brushing, scrubbing, and general cleaning / . . . individual-bristle
mount
15/159.1: Brushing, scrubbing, and general cleaning / brush or broom
15/164:
Brushing, scrubbing, and general
broom . . . special work . . . hollow-ware cleaners

cleaning

/

brush

or

15/167.1:
Brushing, scrubbing, and general cleaning / brush or
broom . . . special work . . . tooth or nail brush
132/120: Toilet / comb . . . with brush or bristles114
Next, a search was conducted within each of these classifications for patents
issued prior to the filing date of Bigio’s patent application (November 30, 1999) serial
number 09/451,747. The following references, which were relied upon by the

110 TotalPatent,
LEXISNEXIS, https://www.lexisnexis.com/totalpatent/signonForm.do (last
visited Aug. 19, 2013).
111 EPO - Espace EP, EUR. PAT. OFF., http://www.epo.org/searching/subscription/ep.html (last
visited Aug. 19, 2013).
112 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en (last accessed
Aug. 29, 2013).
113 International
Patent Classification (IPC), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/ (last accessed Aug. 29, 2013).
114 CLASS 15, supra note 109.
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examiner in the rejection of the Bigio application, were also identified in the search
(among many other references):
US D424,303 (Tobias)115
US D140,438 (Cohen)116
Furthermore, the search uncovered two other references, US 5,165,760 to
Gueret117 and US 4,888,844 to Maggs.118 Both of these patents cite the Flemming
patent (GBD 17,666) which was utilized as a primary reference against the Bigio
application.119 Inventors are held to have constructive knowledge of all analogous art
to the field of their endeavor, which includes publications which are cited against the
prior art found in a search.120 Therefore, references cited against pertinent
references should also be considered pertinent. The search conducted for brushes
analogous to the Bigio brush, conducted in accordance with the USPTO tutorial,
uncovered not only toothbrushes but the exact references relied upon by the
examiner, BPAI, and Federal Circuit in their respective findings that the Bigio
invention was not patentable.
D. Applying the Digital/Objective Search to Klein’s Birdfeeder
In accordance with the aforementioned reasonable search standard for
determining reasonable pertinence, a search was conducted for Klein’s bird feeder
design using the TotalPatent patent search engine provided by the LexisNexis
Group, and the Espacenet patent search engine provided by the European Patent
Office.
Similarly to carrying out the Bigio hair brush search, relevant keywords were
determined based upon examination of the structure, function, and result of all of the
elements of Klein’s bird feeder design. The following keywords were determined to
be relevant: container, receptacle, holder, compartment, plastic, transparent,
divider, separator, partition, vertical, seal, groove, guide, rail, indicia, sugar, water,
food, feed, liquid, bird, animal, mix, proportion, ratio, slide.
Next, relevant United States patent classifications were determined by
searching for each of the identified keywords within the Index to the United State
Patent Classification (“USPC”) System.
Likewise, International patent
classifications could be identified using the International Patent Classification
(“IPC”) Official Publication of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”). The following U.S. patent classifications were determined to be relevant:
U.S. Patent No. D424,303 (filed Mar. 11, 1999).
U.S. Patent No. D140,438 (filed Mar. 22, 1944).
117 U.S. Patent No. 5,165,760 (filed Apr. 12, 1991).
118 U.S. Patent No. 4,888,844 (filed Aug. 31, 1988).
119 Ex parte Bigio, No. 2002-0967, at 2 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 24, 2003).
120 Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit, Waddington N.A., Inc. v. Sabert Corp., 2010 WL
978517 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2010) (No. 209CV04883).
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119/51.01: Animal Husbandry / Feeding Device
119/72: Animal Husbandry / Watering or liquid feed device121
220/532: Receptacles / Vertical partition received in groove or notch in the
container
220/500: Receptacles / Compartmented Container
220/533: Receptacles / Plural partition-receiving grooves or notches122
206/219: Special receptacle or package / For mixing
206/221: Special receptacle or packaging / For mixing, means to manipulate
without rupture123
426/635: Food or edible material: Processes, compositions, and products
/Animal Food124
366/603: Agitating / Animal food Mixer
366/130: Agitating / Operator Supported Mixing Chamber type125
127/14: Sugar, Starch, and Carbohydrates/Mixing tanks.126
Next, a search was conducted within each of these classifications for patents
issued prior to the filing date of Klein’s provisional patent application (Aug. 2, 2001).
All five references relied upon the examiner were identified in the search:
US 1,423,135127
US 580,899128

121 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASS 119 ANIMAL HUSBANDRY, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc119/sched119.htm.
122 U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASS 220 RECEPTACLES, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc220/sched220.htm.
123 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASS 206 SPECIAL RECEPTACLE OR PACKAGE,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc206/sched206.htm.
124 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASS 426 FOOD OR EDIBLE MATERIAL: PROCESSES,
COMPOSITIONS,
AND
PRODUCTS,
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc426/sched426.htm.
125 U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASS 366 AGITATING, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc366/sched366.htm.
126 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASS 127 SUGAR, STARCH, AND CARBOHYDRATES,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc127/sched127.htm.
127 U.S. Patent No. 1,423,135 (filed May 14, 1921).
128 ‘899 Patent, supra note 81.
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US 2,985,333129
US 3,221,917130
US 2,787,268131
The search conducted for art analogous to the Klein bird feeder, done in
accordance with the USPTO tutorial, uncovered the exact references relied upon by
the examiner, BPAI, and Federal Circuit in their respective findings that the Klein
invention was not patentable. Utilizing the USPTO tutorial, one can conclude that
the art relied upon by the examiner, BPAI, and Federal Circuit is “reasonably
pertinent” to the invention and was therefore properly considered.
V. THE REALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES POINT TO “PERTINENT” PRIOR ART BEING
DEFINED BY A REASONABLE SEARCH ON THE INTERNET
Starting at the end of the patenting process, an applicant for a patent cannot
obtain that patent if the claimed invention is found to exist in the prior art,
regardless of whether or not the inventor actually looked in the prior art for a
solution in making the claimed invention.132 Therefore, an inventor is held to have
constructive knowledge of all prior art that can be found from a search via the
Internet. Searching on the Internet by element name, structure, function, or result
eliminates remoteness and renders all resulting prior art to be ipso facto pertinent
and analogous, i.e., Internet searching eliminates non-analogous art.
Inherent in any application is a formal request for something specific. In a
patent application that something specific is defined by the claims “particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming”133 the differences over “the content of the prior
art.”134 The drafting of patent claims is an acquired skill traditionally held by patent
practitioners qualified by the USPTO. The only manner in which a patent
practitioner can ethically exercise this skill is to know the pertinent prior art
resulting from a search via the Internet. In fact, a prior art search is within the
standard of care of a professional patent application preparer.
In addition, the USPTO and the courts should adhere to well-founded legal
principle in claim interpretation that a claim must stand or fall upon the elements
positively recited therein and be unaffected by inferred or intended use language.
The CAFC should sit en banc and expressly deny any argument of non-analogous art
based upon remoteness.
In order to prevent inconsistent opinions such as In re Klein and In re Bigio, the
patent system is ripe for a coordinated application of existing case law, USPTO rules
‘333 Patent, supra note 83.
U.S. Patent No. 3,221,917 (filed July 2, 1963).
131 U.S. Patent No. 2,787,268 (filed Mar. 16, 1956).
132 See Application of Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
133 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
134 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
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and guidelines, and commonly used Internet search engines to bring greater
certainty to the law regarding “pertinent” prior art, and hence greater predictability
and greater respect for patent law. That coordination could use these guidelines:
1. The mere recitation of an intended use, either by external function or
by an adjective, cannot limit the field of endeavor to prevent prior art from
another field of endeavor being reasonably pertinent.
2. An applicant for a patent is held to constructive knowledge of all prior
art which is found in a reasonable search on the Internet using standard
terminology in element name, structure, function or result.
3. All prior art found in that reasonable search on the Internet is
reasonably pertinent, regardless of the field of endeavor.
If the quality of patents is to improve and more certainty is to be brought to
patent litigation, inventors and practitioners should be held to these available and
realistic digital and objective guidelines to define pertinent prior art. Internet
searching for prior art combined with these guidelines effectively eliminates “nonanalogous arts.”

